



Detecting and Preventing DoS Attacks Within IoT Environment Using AWS IoT Core

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Abstract. Detecting and preventing cyber attacks within an IoT (Internet of Things) environment by AWS MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) Broker involves implementing various security measures and best practices. MQTT preferred as lightweight messaging protocol commonly utilized in IoT applications for efficient communication between IoT devices and various cloud services. AWS IoT Core provides an MQTT broker service that allows secure communication between IoT devices and cloud resources. Detecting and preventing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks within an IoT environment using AWS MQTT Broker involves a combination of security measures and services provided by AWS. In this research paper, we studied a couple of cyber attacks, tools, and also demonstrated strategies and tactics to protect the AWS IoT Core environment in which we had implemented and configured custom digital certificate and policy from DoS attacks using various python scripts.

Keywords: IoT · Security · Types of Cyber Attack · DoS Attack

1 Introduction to Cyber Attacks

In today's world, various activities, including economic, industrial, cultural, social, and governmental, are conducted online. Our global society heavily relies on wireless technology, making safeguarding data from cyber-attacks a challenging task. Cyber-attacks are primarily aimed at stealing sensitive credentials, but in some cases, they may have military or political motivations. These attacks can cause various damages, such as viruses, data breaches, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and other sophisticated attack vectors. As a result, many companies and organizations employ diverse solutions to mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks [1, 2].

A cyber attack within the IoT (Internet of Things) refers to a malicious act targeted at exploiting vulnerabilities within IoT devices, networks, or services. The IoT is a vast network of interconnected devices that can include smart home appliances, wearables, industrial machines, medical devices, and more. The interconnected nature of these devices, combined with potential security weaknesses, makes them susceptible to various cyber threats. Here are some major types of cyber attacks within the IoT [3, 4] (Fig. 1):




Fig. 1. Cyber Attacks within IoT

1.1 Botnets Attacks

A botnet attack in IoT (Internet of Things) refers to a cyber attack in which a network of compromised IoT devices is controlled by malicious actors to carry out various malicious activities. Botnets are groups of devices infected with malware and controlled remotely by a single entity, often referred to as the “botmaster” or “bot herder.” These compromised devices, known as bots or zombies, are typically IoT devices with weak security measures [5].

1.2 DoS (Denial of Service) Attacks

A DoS (Denial of Service) attack in IoT (Internet of Things) involves flooding a network of interconnected devices with a massive amount of traffic or requests, overwhelming their resources and causing them to become unavailable to legitimate users. In the context of IoT, a DoS attack can interrupt the common functioning of IoT devices, leading to service outages and potential disruptions in various sectors where IoT devices are employed [6].

1.3 (MiM) Man-in-Middle Attacks

Man-in-Middle (MiM) attacks in IoT (Internet of Things) involve intercepting and potentially modifying the communication between IoT devices or between IoT devices and their central server. In a MitM attack, an unauthorized attacker positions themselves between the communicating parties and secretly relays or alters the messages passing between them, without the parties being aware of the intrusion [6, 7].

1.4 Credential Attacks

Credential attacks in IoT (Internet of Things) refer to cyber attacks that target the authentication credentials used by IoT devices, services, or users to gain unauthorized access to the system. These attacks focus on exploiting weak or stolen credentials, such as usernames and passwords, to compromise IoT devices or networks using brute force attack [6, 7].

1.5 Ransomware Attacks

A ransomware attack within IoT (Internet of Things) involves the deployment of ransomware on IoT devices to encrypt their data and demand a ransom from the device owner or the organization controlling the devices. Ransomware is a one of the type of malware that restricts access to a device or its data until a ransom is paid to the attacker, usually in cryptocurrencies, to obtain the decryption key and regain access to the locked data [6, 7].

1.6 Investigating Security Issues Related to Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks

To effectively investigate and mitigate DoS attacks, it's crucial to establish a baseline of normal network activity.

- Packets out and Bytes out: Unusually high levels of outgoing packets and bytes may indicate that your network is generating an excessive amount of traffic. This could be a sign of a DoS attack, as attackers often flood a target system with traffic to overwhelm it.
- Destination IP: Monitoring the destination IP addresses of incoming traffic can help you identify if there is an unusual concentration of traffic directed at a particular IP address. This could be a sign of a targeted attack.
- Listening TCP ports: An increase in the number of open TCP ports could indicate that services are being exploited, especially if these ports are not typically open. Attackers may be attempting to exploit vulnerabilities in open ports to launch an attack.
- Listening TCP port count: A sudden or significant increase in the number of listening TCP ports may be a sign of unwanted services running on your network. Such services could be exploited by attackers to facilitate a DoS attack.
- Listening UDP ports: Similar to TCP ports, a sudden increase in listening UDP ports may indicate unexpected or potentially vulnerable services. UDP-based DoS attacks are also possible, so monitoring these ports is essential.

Consider that despite the fact these indicators are useful, a more comprehensive security plan should include them. It's also critical to keep up with the most recent DoS attack methods and trends in order to can improve defensive measures appropriately.

2 Related Work

To address the security needs of an IoT system, various methods can be employed [8]. Among them, mutual authentication among the IoT device and the gateway within the resource-constrained environment of the IoT system is of utmost importance. In this

research paper, we propose enhancing security mechanisms using Amazon Web Services (AWS) Core Concepts and MQTT Broker as IoT Middleware. We introduce custom digital certification, private key, and custom policy to facilitate secure communication in the IoT environment. We also performed certain DoS attacks on local server like node-red (127.0.0.1) as well as our implemented IoT middleware model on AWS IoT Core to understand the impact of various DoS attacks [9–11].

2.1 Algorithm for Securing IoT Environment

Step 1: Connection with AWS IoT Core: Establish the connection between things (client or published or subscriber) to IoT core [9, 10] (Fig. 2).

```
"Version": "2023-05-17",
"Statement": [
  {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "iot:Connect",
    "Resource": [
      "arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:123456789012:RKU1/${iot:Connection.Thing.ThingName}"
    ]
  }
]
```

Fig. 2. Connection with AWS IoT Core

Step 2: Define Topic for IoT Devices : In order to transmit or receive message, Topic is essential to be created on cloud services (Fig. 3).

```
arn:aws:iot:aws-region:dhaval.nimavat:topic/Topic
```

Fig. 3. IoT Topic

Step 3: Implementing and assigning custom digital certificate to ensure authentication among IoT devices which includes own private key using OpenSSL (LibreSSL 2.8) (Figs. 4 and 5).

Step 4: Generate and define custom MQTT policy: AWS IoT Core policies are structured in JSON format, encompassing rules for establishing connections, message retention, message publishing, message receiving, and topic subscription. The custom policy on AWS, illustrated in the following figure [9–11] (Fig. 6).

Step 5: Assign certificate and policy to IoT Devices: In the context of AWS IoT, we had utilized Node-RED platform to implement and utilize digital signature and policy

```

dhavalnimavat ~ -zsh -- 126x26
Last login: Fri May 19 11:56:20 on ttys002
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ % openssl version
 LibreSSL 2.8.3
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ % ssh-keygen -t rsa
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter file in which to save the key (/Users/dhavalnimavat/.ssh/id_rsa): dmn_private
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in dmn_private
Your public key has been saved in dmn_private.pub
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:7Q3+t24m8j3CevCJAY20Ph5U6YwxxpU0mMfJhu5UnVU dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air.local
The key's randomart image is:
+----[RSA 3072]-----+
|
|  B + . . . E
|  + #
|  + &
|    o B =
|   o S +
|    * =
|    . = B .
|    + 0.00
|    * . = 0
+----[SHA256]-----+
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ %
    
```

Fig. 4. Generated Private Key, OpenSSL


```

dhavalnimavat ~ -zsh -- 121x32
Last login: Fri May 19 11:46:33 on ttys000
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ % openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout dmn_private.key -out RKU_CSR.csr
Generating a 4096 bit RSA private key
.....++
.....++
writing new private key to 'dmn_private.key'
Enter PEM pass phrase:
Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:
-----
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value.
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) []:IN
State or Province Name (full name) []:Gujarat
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Rajkot
Organization Name (eg, company) []:RKU
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:School of Engineering
Common Name (eg, fully qualified host name) []:www.rku.ac.in
Email Address []:dhaval.nimavat@gmail.com

Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ %
    
```

Fig. 5. Generated custom digital certificates using 4096 bit private key

techniques for a specific use case. Node-RED is a visual programming tool kit that allows users to design and deploy applications by connecting different nodes representing various services or functionalities. Within AWS IoT Environment, Node red architect can be employed to coordinate the required configurations for digital signatures and policies (Figs. 7, 8 and 9).



RKU_Policy <small>Info</small>				Edit active version	Delete
Details					
Policy ARN arn:aws:iot:us-east-1:23306298:policy/RKU_Policy	Active version 1	Created May 18, 2023, 16:20:34 (UTC+05:30)	Last updated May 18, 2023, 16:20:34 (UTC+05:30)		

Fig. 6. Policy for IoT Devices



Download certificates and keys

Download certificate and key files to install on your device so that it can connect to AWS.

Device certificate
You can activate the certificate now, or later. The certificate must be active for a device to connect to AWS IoT.

Device certificate: b5ad012ea58...te.pem.crt Deactivate certificate Download


Key files
The key files are unique to this certificate and can't be downloaded after you leave this page. Download them now and save them in a secure place.

This is the only time you can download the key files for this certificate.

Public key file: b5ad012ea58b516d0e28d4e...2c92320-public.pem.key Download

Private key file: b5ad012ea58b516d0e28d4e...c92320-private.pem.key Download

Fig. 7. Download certificate and private key



The screenshot shows the Node-RED interface with a flow named 'weather' containing two 'openweathermap' nodes. The 'Edit mqtt-broker node' configuration panel is open, showing the following settings:

- Name: RKU_RAC_DEMOI
- Connection: Security
- Server: a11md9k4kollzeta-ats.iot.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com, Port: 8883
- Connect automatically:
- Use TLS: awsCertificate
- Protocol: MQTT V3.1.1
- Client ID: RKU_Client_1
- Keep Alive: 60
- Session: Use clean session

Fig. 8. MQTT Broker Configuration on Node-Red.

This case study involves utilizing the OpenWeatherAPI as the publisher and a subscriber running on <https://127.0.0.1:1880>. The implementation includes customized AWS IoT Core Concepts, utilizing the IoT Topic “MQTT/SensorData1”, a custom private key “dmn-private.key”, a generated digital certificate “RKU-CSR.csr”, and a policy named “RKU-Policy” [9–11].




Fig. 9. Results of secured communication between pub (Open Weather API) and sub.

3 Results on DoS Attacks

In this research paper, we also find evidence of following assaults on the proposed AWS MQTT broker (Middleware Architecture) as well as the local server(Node-RED) and WiFi router. It is important to note that engaging in any form of cyber attack, including flood attacks, socket attacks, packet sniffing, or packet injection without explicit authorization is illegal and unethical. These attacks can cause significant harm to targeted systems and networks, and engaging in such activities may lead to serious legal consequences [4].

3.1 Flood Attack

A flood attack, also known as a denial-of-service (DoS) flood attack, aims to overwhelm a target system or network by sending a large volume of traffic or requests. The flood of traffic consumes the target’s resources, causing service disruptions and making it unavailable to legitimate users. Here result of flood attacks shown in below figures to various local server, WIFI router and proposed middleware architecture [12, 13] (Figs. 10, 11 and 12).

3.2 Socket Attack

A socket attack involves targeting the communication channels known as sockets that are used to establish connections between devices or between a device and a server. In the context of attacks, it can refer to exploiting vulnerabilities in socket communication protocols to disrupt or manipulate data exchange. Here result of socket attacks shown in below figures to various local server, WIFI router and proposed middleware architecture [14] (Figs. 13, 14 and 15).

```
dhavalnimavat -- -zsh -- 91x13
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2894
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2895
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2896
..Request timeout for icmp_seq 2898
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2899
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2900
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2901
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2902
^C
--- 127.0.0.1 ping statistics ---
2904 packets transmitted, 2109 packets received, 27.4% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 0.0111/0.029/0.125/0.010 ms
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ %
```

Fig. 10. Flood Attack on Node-Red 127.0.0.1

```
dhavalnimavat -- -zsh -- 94x10
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 3929
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 3930
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 3931
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 3932
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 3933
^C
--- 10.29.31.255 ping statistics ---
3935 packets transmitted, 1596 packets received, +2151 duplicates, 59.4% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 0.018/196.084/503.959/141.076 ms
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ %
```

Fig. 11. Flood Attack on WIFI Router 10.29.31.25

```
dhavalnimavat -- -zsh -- 129x16
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2956
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2957
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2958
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2959
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2960
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2961
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2962
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2963
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2964
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2965
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2966
.Request timeout for icmp_seq 2967
^C
--- a1tmd6k4o9zxna-ats.iot.us-east-1.amazonaws.com ping statistics ---
2969 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100.0% packet loss
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air ~ %
```

Fig. 12. Flood Attack on Proposed Middleware Architecture

```
Kali_Linux -- -zsh -- 95x6
dhavalnimavat@Dhavalns-MacBook-Air kali_linux % python3 SocketAttack.py
Enter the target IP address: 127.0.0.1
How long before the connection times out: 3
Listening on port: 7000
Listening on port: 1800
Listening on port: 5000
```

Fig. 13. Socket Attack on Node-Red 127.0.0.1

3.3 Packet Sniffing

Packet sniffing, also known as packet capturing, involves intercepting and monitoring network traffic to track and monitor the data packets that are transmitted over the network. This is often used for legitimate purposes like network troubleshooting, but it could also

Table 1. Impact of Cyber Attacks on Middleware Architecture

Types of Attack	OS	Script	Packets	127.0.0.1	10.29.31.25	Proposed Middleware
Flood Attack	macOS	Python3	~3000	2109 Packet Received	1596 Packet Received	No Packet Received
Socket Attack	Kali-Linux	Python3	~3000	Found 3 Ports	Found 1 Ports	Port Not Found
Packet Sniffing Attack	Kali- Linux	Python3	–	Packets Observed	Packets Observed	No Packet Observed
Packet Injection Attack	Kali- Linux	Python3	–	Applied	Applied	Connection Aborted

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, detecting and preventing cyber attacks within an IoT environment using AWS MQTT Broker is of paramount importance to ensure the security and reliability of IoT systems. MQTT, being a lightweight messaging protocol, plays a crucial role in facilitating efficient communication among IoT devices and cloud services, making AWS IoT’s MQTT broker service a valuable tool in this context. The research paper presented a comprehensive experimental results of different cyber attacks, tools, and demonstrated effective strategies and tactics to protect the AWS IoT Core environment. The implementation and configuration of custom digital certificates and policies were instrumental in fortifying the system against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which pose significant threats to IoT infrastructures. The combination of security measures and services provided by AWS is essential to safeguard IoT devices and cloud resources from potential threats. By employing proactive security practices, such as regular updates, network segmentation, authentication mechanisms, and continuous monitoring, organizations can significantly enhance the resilience of their IoT systems. As IoT technology continues to advance and become more ubiquitous, ensuring the security and integrity of IoT environments becomes increasingly crucial. The research and efforts dedicated to detecting and preventing cyber attacks within an IoT ecosystem will contribute significantly to creating a safer and more secure connected world. By staying vigilant and implementing best practices, stakeholders can mitigate the risks and potential damages caused by cyber attacks, ensuring the continued growth and advancement of the IoT landscape.

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