



A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks Under Uncertainty

Zhifan Xu¹(✉) and Melike Baykal-Gürsoy²

¹ Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Rutgers University,
Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA

zhifan.xu@rutgers.edu

² Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Rutgers University,
RUTCOR and CAIT, Piscataway, USA

gursoy@soe.rutgers.edu

Abstract. Considered is a multi-channel wireless network for secret communication that uses the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the performance measure. An eavesdropper can intercept encoded messages through a degraded channel of each legitimate transmitter-receiver communication pair. A friendly interferer, on the other hand, may send cooperative jamming signals to enhance the secrecy performance of the whole network. Besides, the state information of the eavesdropping channel may not be known completely. The transmitters and the friendly interferer have to cooperatively decide on the optimal jamming power allocation strategy that balances the secrecy performance with the cost of employing intentional interference, while the eavesdropper tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. To solve this problem, we propose and analyze a non-zero sum game between the network defender and the eavesdropper who can only attack a limited number of channels. We show that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the players are of threshold type. We present an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategy pair. Numerical examples demonstrate the equilibrium and contrast it to baseline strategies.

Keywords: Non-zero sum game · Cooperative jamming · Physical layer security · Incomplete channel state information

1 Introduction

Wireless communication networks are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks due to the multi-cast nature of wireless communication. Considering the fast development of various forms of wireless communication networks, such as wireless sensor networks and vehicle communication networks, information secrecy against

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eavesdropping attacks has become more and more critical. Traditionally, securing messages transmitted through wireless networks depends on encryption and randomness in coding schemes [25, 32]. It is shown that the difference between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel capacities, which is defined as *Secrecy Capacity*, decides the secrecy level of transmitter-receiver pairs [19].

During the last decade, various efforts have been made to investigate the security of wireless communication networks at the physical layer, which is coined as *Physical Layer Security*. It is shown that intentionally generated interference signals, either mixed into the signal by the transmitter or sent by a third party helper, can decrease the channel capacity between the transmitter and the eavesdropper at the physical layer [11, 23, 27–30]. Thus, the secrecy capacity of the transmitter-receiver channel can be increased by employing intentional interference signals at the transmitter-eavesdropper channel. This approach is usually referred to as *Cooperative Jamming* when interference signals are sent by helpers or other components (i.e., idle relays) in a wireless network [29, 30].

Researchers have studied the power control strategies and configurations of cooperative jamming signals under various setups [4, 16]. Traditional power allocation schemes for cooperative jamming on a multi-channel network usually consider passive eavesdroppers listening in all channels. However, considerable portion of cooperative jamming power is wasted under such schemes if some channels are not actually attacked by eavesdroppers. Besides, due to other constraints on the number of antennas or on the available power, an eavesdropper may not be able to attack all channels at the same time. Instead of simply assigning an arbitrary probability to each channel for being under eavesdropping attack, a game-theoretic model leaves that decision to the eavesdropper who tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. In fact, in such game-theoretic settings, an eavesdropper could be a strategic player or nature. A strategic player tries to maximize his/her own payoff function while nature is always assumed to work against its adversary. As shown in [13] and [20], a natural disaster is considered to have been caused by an intelligent player who targets the weakest point of the system, while the defender uses limited resources to harden valuable assets. In [35], Yolmeh and Baykal-Gürsoy investigated the optimal patrolling policy against potential terrorist attacks for a railway system. Wei *et al.* [31] studied the protection strategy of a power system against an attacker who has enough knowledge of how power systems operate.

This paper considers the optimal power allocation strategy for cooperative jamming on a multi-channel wireless communication system. Such problems arise, for example, in military operations, where a frequency division multiplexing (FDM) communication system is used to transmit confidential messages in an adversarial environment. Particularly, we focus on the scenario in which the presence of eavesdroppers at each communication channel is uncertain and the state information of the eavesdropper's channels is not completely known. In previous works, the assumption of complete channel state information (CSI) has been widely used to analyze the optimal power allocation strategy for cooperative jamming. However, as argued in [6, 15], CSI may not be easily obtained

since eavesdropping channels' state information is closely related to eavesdroppers' private information such as their hidden location and antenna setups. It is unrealistic to assume complete CSI when the existence of an eavesdropper is even unknown.

A non-zero-sum Nash game for the multi-channel wireless communication system describes the confrontation between a friendly interferer and a strategic eavesdropper. Thus, the eavesdropper is also a decision maker who can select a communication channel to attack. In addition, the game-theoretic model incorporates the probability distributions of the eavesdropper's fading channel gains into the players' payoff functions instead of using simple estimators such as the mean. Moreover, there is a cost for the usage of cooperative jamming power since the friendly interferer may be a third party service provider. We show that the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy of each player is of threshold type. We present an algorithm to compute the equilibrium strategy, and apply it to numerical examples to demonstrate its usage and contrast NE to baseline strategies. If the friendly interferer naively assigns the jamming power without taking into account the presence of a strategic eavesdropper, the system may not reach its ultimate secrecy capacity.

1.1 Related Works

Due to limitations on battery and power technologies in their current state, finding optimal power control strategies has been a crucial problem for cooperative jamming. Dong *et al.* [7] studied a wireless wiretap channel, with a single source-destination pair and an eavesdropper, aided by a friendly interferer equipped with multiple antennas. The authors presented the optimal configuration of all jamming antennas to maximize secrecy capacity under a total power constraint. Yang *et al.* [34] considered a multi-user broadcast network where a single eavesdropper with multiple antennas attacks all data streams simultaneously. They proposed and solved an optimization problem for a friendly interferer to maximize the minimum secrecy rate of all data streams under total power and minimum rate constraints. Cumanan *et al.* [5] investigated a secrecy capacity maximization problem for a single source-receiver pair in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and multiple friendly interferers. They derived the optimal power level of each friendly interferer by taking into account the detrimental effect of interference also on the intended receiver. Zhang *et al.* [37] studied wireless cooperative jamming for an orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) communication system, in which the friendly interferer needs to optimally assign the limited jamming power to all subcarriers in order to maximize the total secrecy capacity. In these models, communication networks are controlled by a single decision maker such as a friendly interferer or a transmitter, since the eavesdroppers are assumed to be present at every existing communication channel.

In reality, wireless network secrecy may not only depend on the strategy of one decision maker. A strategic eavesdropper may also be an active decision maker. Game-theoretic models arise naturally when conflict of interest exists

among different decision makers, as discussed in the survey by Manshaei *et al.* [21]. Altman *et al.* [1] obtained a transmitter's optimal power allocation strategy against a hostile jammer using game-theoretic models. The authors later extended the model to incomplete information CSI case [2]. Han *et al.* [12] studied a pricing game for the negotiation of security service price between transmitters and multiple friendly interferers. Yuan *et al.* [36] derived the optimal strategy for a two-user Gaussian interference channel in which each user can decide to activate cooperative jamming by themselves. Gradually, researchers started to use game-theoretic approaches to explore attack scenarios in which not all communication channels will be eavesdropped. Garnaev and Trappe [10] proposed a type of active eavesdropper who strategically attacks a limited number of wireless channels. In [8], Garnaev *et al.* considered a target selection game between a friendly interferer and an eavesdropper with players working on a single channel at a time. Recently, we have investigated a power control game for cooperative jamming against a strategic eavesdropper who can only attack one of N parallel channels [33]. A threshold type power allocation plan is obtained under the complete CSI assumption.

Most works mentioned above, except [2], which considers a hostile jammer instead of eavesdroppers, assume complete CSI obtained either instantaneously or statistically from historical data, ignoring the fact that it may actually be difficult to get complete CSI of eavesdropping channels since eavesdroppers are hiding and listening passively. Various efforts have been made to overcome this assumption in traditional setup when eavesdroppers are assumed to attack every existing communication channel. Garnaev and Trappe [9] presented a zero-sum anti-eavesdropping game for transmission power allocation on a multi-channel communication network, in which the environment is regarded as a hostile player that makes CSI as bad as possible. Hu *et al.* [14] investigated a cooperative jamming aided multiple-input-single-output (MISO) communication system with network defenders working together to maximize secrecy capacity under a constraint on the secrecy outage probability (SOP). Si *et al.* [26] studied the power control problem under SOP constraints for cooperative jamming against another type of active eavesdroppers who can listen and send hostile jamming signals at the same time. In cases that complete CSI is not available, some historical information might be acquired to infer the probability distributions of the eavesdroppers' CSIs.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper studying the cooperative jamming game against a strategic eavesdropper under the incomplete CSI assumption. The NE strategy derived leads to a more intelligent power allocation strategy that can handle complex, uncertainty environments.

1.2 Summary of Contributions

This paper

1. introduces a non-zero sum cooperative jamming game considering a strategic eavesdropper, uncertain CSIs, and jamming costs;

2. incorporates the probability distributions of the eavesdropper's CSIs into the players' payoff functions instead of using estimators directly;
3. derives a threshold type power allocation policy, and presents an algorithm to compute the NE strategy pair.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3 proposes two basic optimization problems, one for the defender and the other for the eavesdropper. Section 4 introduces a non-zero sum game model when the fading channel gains of eavesdropping channels are characterized by discrete distributions. Section 5 demonstrates numerical examples and compares the game-theoretic model in Sect. 4 with the method of approximating fading channel gains using mean values. Section 6 summarizes conclusions and discusses possible future research.

2 System Model and Game Formulation

2.1 System Model

Consider a wireless communication network with N parallel channels, such as the frequency division multiplexing (FDM) communication system as shown in Fig. 1. Each channel occupies a different frequency and the interference from adjacent channels is mitigated via techniques like pulse-shaping filters. An eavesdropper, due to budget limitations, or to reduce the risk of Local Oscillator (LO) leakage power emitted from eavesdropping antennas that may reveal her hidden location (see [24, 38]), is using hardware with limited capability and can only listen on n of N different frequencies at the same time. A friendly interferer can simultaneously send cooperative jamming signals to N communication channels, and is tasked to enhance the overall secrecy performance against the eavesdropper. Let SINR represents the throughput on each channel, which is very often used, especially for systems operating under low SINR regime [17, 18]. Thus, the Shannon capacity can be approximated by SINR, and the communication capacity for each channel $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$, is

$$C_{L_i} = \ln \left(1 + \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} \right) \approx \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i},$$

with T_i as the transmission power, σ_i as the background noise, and g_i as the fading channel gain from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver at channel i . We assume that cooperative jamming signals will not interfere with the legitimate receiver, which might be achieved when jamming signals are designed to be nullified at the receiver or the friendly interferer is carefully positioned to be away from the receiver [11, 16, 23]. The eavesdropper can intercept encrypted messages on channel i through a degraded eavesdropping channel with capacity

$$C_{E_i}(J_i) = \ln \left(1 + \frac{\alpha_i T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i J_i} \right) \approx \frac{\alpha_i T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i J_i},$$




Fig. 1. FDM network with N channels, aided by a friendly interferer.

with J_i as the cooperative jamming power assigned to channel i , α_i as the fading channel gain from transmitter i to the eavesdropper and β_i as the fading channel gain from the friendly interferer to the eavesdropper at channel i .

If channel i is not under an eavesdropping attack, the full communication capacity can be used to transmit secret information. However, if channel i is attacked, information can be transmitted secretly only when the receiver’s channel is more capable than the eavesdropper’s channel. The difference of these capacities is called channel i ’s secrecy capacity, $C_{S_i}(J_i)$, given as

$$C_{S_i}(J_i) = [C_{L_i}(J_i) - C_{E_i}(J_i)]^+.$$

We assume that the friendly interferer does not know the fading channel gains of eavesdropping channels with certainty, but has a belief about the distributions of fading channel gains according to her knowledge of the communication environment and possible locations of the eavesdropper. Let A_i be the random variable representing the fading channel gain of transmission signals at eavesdropping channel i such that

$$\Pr(A_i = \alpha_i^m) = q_i^m, \quad \forall m \in \{1, \dots, M_i\},$$

with M_i denoting the number of possible transmission gains. Let B_i be the random variable representing the fading channel gain of jamming signals at eavesdropping channel i such that

$$\Pr(B_i = \beta_i^k) = p_i^k, \quad \forall k \in \{1, \dots, K_i\},$$

with K_i denoting the number of possible eavesdropping channel gains. Assume A_i and B_i are independent. Thus, with probability $p_i^k q_i^m$, the eavesdropping capacity at channel i is

$$C_{E_i}^{k,m}(J_i) \approx \frac{\alpha_i^m T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i},$$

and the expected eavesdropping capacity at channel i is

$$\mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(J_i)] = \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \sum_{m=1}^{M_i} p_i^k q_i^m C_{E_i}^{k,m}(J_i) \approx \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i}\right],$$

where $\mathbb{E}[A_i] = \sum_{i=1}^{M_i} q_i^m \alpha_i^m$ and $\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i}\right] = \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i}$. The case when A_i 's and B_i 's are continuous random variables is left for future discussion. Also, for the sake of simplicity, assume $\mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(0)]$'s are all distinct.

Note that, every eavesdropping channel should always be a degraded version of the corresponding communication channel, so assume

$$g_i > \max\{\alpha_i^m, m = 1, \dots, M_i\}, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N. \quad (1)$$

Under assumption (1), it will always be true that $C_{L_i} > C_{E_i}^{k,m}(J_i)$. Thus, with probability $p_i^k q_i^m$, the secrecy capacity for each channel i is

$$C_{S_i}^{k,m}(J_i) = C_{L_i} - C_{E_i}^{k,m}(J_i) \approx \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \frac{\alpha_i^m T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i}.$$

Then, the expected secrecy capacity for channel i under cooperative jamming power J_i is

$$\mathbb{E}[C_{S_i}(J_i)] = \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \sum_{m=1}^{M_i} p_i^k q_i^m C_{S_i}^{k,m}(J_i) \approx \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i}\right],$$

which is a positive concave function w.r.t. $J_i \geq 0$.

Assume that the friendly interferer incurs $\$c$ per unit power used for jamming. Meanwhile, it earns $\$r$ from network users per unit secrecy capacity achieved. Thus, the payoff at channel i after applying J_i level of cooperative jamming is

$$\tilde{\mu}_i(J_i) \equiv \begin{cases} r \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - c J_i, & \text{if channel } i \text{ is not attacked,} \\ r \left(\frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i}\right] \right) - c J_i, & \text{if channel } i \text{ is attacked.} \end{cases}$$

Remaining sections use the following simplified payoff function obtained by substituting $\gamma = c/r$.

$$\mu_i(J_i) \equiv \frac{\tilde{\mu}_i(J_i)}{r} = \begin{cases} \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \gamma J_i, & \text{if channel } i \text{ is not attacked,} \\ \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i}\right] - \gamma J_i, & \text{if channel } i \text{ is attacked,} \end{cases}$$

Note that, it is not beneficial to send cooperative jamming signals to channel i if:

1. channel i is not being eavesdropped, or
2. it is too expensive to enhance secrecy capacity by applying cooperative jamming.

The eavesdropper can only attack n out of N channels. Let y_i be the probability that channel i is under an eavesdropping attack, so the expected payoff to the friendly interferer at channel i is

$$\mathbb{E}[\mu_i(J_i)] = \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - y_i \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i}\right] - \gamma J_i.$$

Note that $\mathbb{E}[\mu_i(J_i)]$ is a concave function of J_i , since

$$\frac{d}{dJ_i} \mathbb{E}[\mu_i(J_i)] = y_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \beta_i^k T_i}{(\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i)^2} - \gamma,$$

is a decreasing function of J_i . It is optimal not to jam channel i unless

$$\frac{d}{dJ_i} \mathbb{E}[\mu_i(J_i = 0)] = y_i \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}[B_i] T_i}{\sigma_i^2} - \gamma > 0, \quad (2)$$

where $\mathbb{E}[B_i] = \sum_{i=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \beta_i^k$. Inequality (2) provides a lower bound on y_i that makes the friendly interferer jam channel i .

2.2 Formulation of the Game

The proposed non-zero sum Nash game solves the friendly interferer's problem of effectively responding to an eavesdropper who strategically picks some channels to attack. The game is played between the friendly interferer as the defender, who decides on the jamming power allocation plan, and a strategic eavesdropper as the attacker. That is, the defender's strategy is $\mathbf{J} = (J_1, \dots, J_N)$ with $J_i \geq 0$, $\forall i = 1, \dots, N$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^N J_i \leq J$, where $J > 0$ is the total power available to the friendly interferer. The attacker's strategy is $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_N)$ with $0 \leq y_i \leq 1$, $\forall i = 1, \dots, N$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i = n$, with y_i representing the probability of targeting channel i . Both the friendly interferer and the eavesdropper have complete knowledge about the system parameters.

While the attacker tries to choose n channels to attack in order to maximize her total expected eavesdropping capacity, the defender tries to send cooperative jamming signals to channels to maximize the overall utility of the whole network. Thus, for a given pair of strategy pair, (\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}) , the defender's payoff is

$$v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}) = \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{E}[\mu_i(J_i)] = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i} \right] - \gamma \sum_{i=1}^N J_i, \quad (3)$$

and the eavesdropper's payoff is

$$v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}) = \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(J_i)] = \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i} \right]. \quad (4)$$

Note that increasing the total expected eavesdropping capacity will result in the decrease of the total expected secrecy capacity, so the defender and the eavesdropper are playing a game with conflicting interests. Also note that only $\mathbb{E}[A_i]$ but not $\mathbb{E}[B_i]$ appears in both payoff functions.

The Nash Equilibrium (NE) provides a pair of power allocation and attack plans $(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*)$ such that no player has an incentive to unilaterally change its policy, i.e.,

$$v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}^*) \leq v_D(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*), \quad \forall \mathbf{J} \in \mathcal{J},$$

$$v_E(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}) \leq v_E(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*), \quad \forall \mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{Y},$$

where \mathcal{J} is the region containing all possible power allocation strategies \mathbf{J} and \mathcal{Y} is the region containing all probabilistic attack strategies \mathbf{y} in this game.

3 Best Response Functions

We present two optimization problems each corresponding to the best response for each player when the other player's strategy is fixed.

First consider the case when the defender's cooperative jamming strategy, $\mathbf{J} = (J_1, \dots, J_N)$, is fixed and is known to the eavesdropper. In this case, the eavesdropper solves the following optimization problem to maximize the total expected eavesdropping capacities,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\mathbf{y}} \quad & v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}) = \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i} \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \leq n, \\ & 0 \leq y_i \leq 1, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N. \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Clearly, (5) is a linear optimization problem w.r.t \mathbf{y} since $v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})$ is a linear function of \mathbf{y} for fixed \mathbf{J} , with linear constraints. Thus, the response of the eavesdropper can be found as given in the next theorem.

Theorem 1. *For a fixed cooperative jamming strategy, \mathbf{J} , the optimal strategy for the active eavesdropper is to eavesdrop on the channels that have the top n largest expected eavesdropping capacities $\mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i} \right]$.*

Proof. It is easy to see that

$$\frac{\partial v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})}{\partial y_i} = \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i} \right], \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N,$$

which are constants for fixed \mathbf{J} . Thus, to maximize $v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})$, we should increase y_i 's with the largest $\frac{\partial v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})}{\partial y_i}$ as much as possible. \square

Next, consider the case when the defender knows the eavesdropper's attack strategy ahead of time, i.e., $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_N)$ is fixed and is revealed to the defender. In this case, the defender solves the following optimization problem to maximize the total utility of secrecy performance,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\mathbf{J}} \quad & v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}) = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{T_i}{\sigma_i + B_i J_i} \right] - \gamma \sum_{i=1}^N J_i \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{i=1}^N J_i \leq J, \\ & J_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N. \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Note that $v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})$ is a convex function w.r.t. \mathbf{J} . Thus, problem (6) is a convex optimization problem w.r.t. \mathbf{J} . Next theorem provides the best response of the defender.

Theorem 2. *The best payoff of the defender against the eavesdropper's strategy, $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_N)$ is*

$$v_D^* = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{g_i T_i}{\sigma_i} - \sum_{i=1}^N \left[\sum_{k=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \frac{y_i \mathbb{E}[A_i] T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i^o(w_D)} - \gamma J_i^o(w_D) \right],$$

where $w_D \geq 0$ is a threshold value and $(J_1^o(w_D), \dots, J_N^o(w_D))$ is the optimal power allocation strategy such that

(a) if

$$y_i T_i \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}[B_i]}{\sigma_i^2} - \gamma > w_D$$

then $J_i^o(w_D)$ is the unique root of the following equation

$$F_i(x) = w_D,$$

where

$$F_i(x) := y_i T_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \beta_i^k p_i^k}{(\sigma_i + \beta_i^k x)^2} - \gamma,$$

(b) if

$$y_i T_i \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}[B_i]}{\sigma_i^2} - \gamma \leq w_D$$

then $J_i^o(w_D) = 0$.

Moreover, the threshold value $w_D \geq 0$ is a real number such that if

$$\sum_{i=1}^N J_i^o(0) > J,$$

then w_D is the unique root of the equation

$$\sum_{i=1}^N J_i^o(w_D) = J,$$

otherwise $w_D = 0$.

Proof. Note that

$$F_i(J_i) = \frac{\partial v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})}{\partial J_i},$$

and

$$F_i(0) = y_i T_i \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}[B_i]}{\sigma_i^2} - \gamma.$$

By the KKT conditions for problem (6), a vector $\mathbf{J} = (J_1, \dots, J_N)$ is the optimal solution if there exists a Lagrange multiplier $w_D > 0$ and non-negative coefficients $\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_N$ such that

$$\begin{cases} w_D(J - \sum_{i=1}^N J_i) = 0, \\ \lambda_i J_i = 0, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N, \\ w_D = F_i(J_i) + \lambda_i, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N. \end{cases}$$

Consider the last equality $w_D = F_i(J_i) + \lambda_i$. Since $\lambda_i \geq 0$ and $F_i(J_i)$ is decreasing in J_i , if $F_i(0) > w_D$, then J_i must be positive. Furthermore, since $\lambda_i J_i = 0$, then $F_i(J_i) = w_D$ if $F_i(0) > w_D$. On the other hand, if $F_i(0) \leq w_D$, then $J_i = 0$ and $\lambda_i = w_D - F_i(0)$.

Let $\mathbf{J}^o(w_D)$ denote the solution to the above KKT conditions as a function of w_D . If $\sum_{i=1}^N J_i^o(0) \leq J$, then $\mathbf{J}^o(0)$ is a feasible solution. Thus, $w_D = 0$ and $\mathbf{J}^o(0)$ is the optimal solution. But, if $\sum_{i=1}^N J_i^o(0) > J$, then $\mathbf{J}^o(0)$ is not a feasible solution. It follows that $w_D > 0$. Thus,

$$\sum_{i=1}^N J_i^o(w_D) = J,$$

since $w_D(J - \sum_{i=1}^N J_i^o(w_D)) = 0$. □

4 Nonzero-Sum Game Under Uncertainty

This section considers the general case and derives conditions for the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Since $v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}^*)$ given \mathbf{y}^* is a concave function w.r.t. $\mathbf{J} \in \mathcal{J}$ and $v_E(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y})$ given \mathbf{J}^* is a linear function w.r.t. $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{Y}$, a NE exists [3]. By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, the NE cooperative jamming strategy \mathbf{J}^* should satisfy the KKT conditions:

$$\left. \frac{\partial v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}^*)}{\partial J_i} \right|_{\mathbf{J}=\mathbf{J}^*} = y_i^* \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \beta_i^k T_i}{(\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i^*)^2} - \gamma \begin{cases} = w_D, & \text{if } J_i^* > 0, \\ \leq w_D, & \text{if } J_i^* = 0, \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, N$, and

$$w_D \left(\sum_{i=1}^N J_i^* - J \right) = 0,$$

where $w_D \geq 0$ is a Lagrange multiplier. Similarly, the NE attack strategy \mathbf{y}^* should satisfy the KKT conditions:

$$\left. \frac{\partial v_E(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y})}{\partial y_i} \right|_{\mathbf{y}=\mathbf{y}^*} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i^*} \begin{cases} \geq w_A, & \text{if } y_i^* = 1, \\ = w_A, & \text{if } 0 < y_i^* < 1, \\ \leq w_A, & \text{if } y_i^* = 0, \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, N$, where $w_A \geq 0$ is a Lagrange multiplier.

In this paper, we limit the capability of the active eavesdropper to $n = 1$ and leave the case $n > 1$ for future discussion. Next theorem describes the case in which the active eavesdropper adopts a pure strategy in the NE, that is, $y_i^* = 1$ for a single channel $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$.

Theorem 3. *Let m be a positive integer such that*

$$\mathbb{E}[C_{E_m}(0)] = \max \{ \mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(0)], i = 1, \dots, N \}.$$

Let \mathbf{y}^o be an attack strategy such that

$$y_i^o = \begin{cases} 1, & i = m, \\ 0, & \forall i \neq m, \end{cases}$$

and \tilde{w}_D and $\mathbf{J}^o(\tilde{w}_D)$ be the corresponding threshold value and the optimal power allocation strategy, respectively, as discussed in Theorem 2. If

$$\mathbb{E}[C_{E_m}(\tilde{J}_m^o(\tilde{w}_D))] \geq \mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(0)], \quad \forall i \neq m,$$

then $(\mathbf{J}^, \mathbf{y}^*) = (\mathbf{J}^o(\tilde{w}_D), \mathbf{y}^o)$ is a pair of NE strategies with a pure eavesdropper's strategy.*

Proof. We provide a proof in Appendix A. □

When such a pure attack strategy is not in the Nash Equilibrium, \mathbf{y}^* will be a mixed strategy such that $0 \leq y_i^* < 1, \forall i = 1, \dots, N$. Thus, KKT conditions (8) can be simplified to

$$\left. \frac{\partial v_E(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y})}{\partial y_i} \right|_{\mathbf{y}=\mathbf{y}^*} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i^*} \begin{cases} = w_A, & \text{if } y_i^* > 0, \\ \leq w_A, & \text{if } y_i^* = 0, \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, N$. The next theorem describes the general NE strategy pair.

Theorem 4. *Let w_A be a Lagrange multiplier with a given value and $\mathbf{J}(w_A)$ be a cooperative jamming strategy such that*

$$J_i(w_A) = \begin{cases} \text{the unique root of } R_i(x) = w_A, & \text{if } \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] T_i}{\sigma_i} > w_A, \\ 0, & \text{if } \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] T_i}{\sigma_i} \leq w_A, \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, N$, with

$$R_i(x) := \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} p_i^k \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] T_i}{\sigma_i + \beta_i^k x},$$

and the capacity constraint

$$\sum_{i=1}^N J_i(w_A) \leq J.$$

Let w_D be another Lagrange multiplier such that

$$w_D = \begin{cases} \text{the unique root of } \sum_{i \in I(w_A)} y_i(w_A, w_D) = 1, & \text{if } \sum_{i=1}^N J_i(w_A) = J, \\ 0, & \text{if } \sum_{i=1}^N J_i(w_A) < J, \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

where

$$I(w_A) = \{i = 1, \dots, N : J_i(w_A) > 0\},$$

and $\mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D)$ is an attack strategy such that

$$y_i(w_A, w_D) = \begin{cases} H_i(w_A, w_D), & \text{if } J_i(w_A) > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i]T_i}{\sigma_i} < w_A, \\ \min \left\{ \left[1 - \sum_{j \in I(w_A)} y_j(w_A, w_D) \right]^+, H_i(w_A, w_D) \right\}, & \text{if } \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i]T_i}{\sigma_i} = w_A, \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, N$, where

$$H_i(w_A, w_D) = \frac{\gamma + w_D}{T_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \frac{p_i^k \mathbb{E}[A_i] \beta_i^k}{(\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i(w_A))^2}}.$$

Then, $(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*) = (\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ is a pair of NE strategies if

1. $w_D \geq 0$, and
2. $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) = 1$.

Proof. We provide a proof in Appendix B. □

Let us now analyze the process to find the value of w_A . Note that $w_A \geq \bar{w}_A$ where \bar{w}_A is the unique root of

$$\sum_{i=1}^N J_i(w_A) = J.$$

If $w_A = \bar{w}_A$ and $w_D \geq 0$ as the solution of Eqs. (11) and (12), then a pair of equilibrium strategies has been found.

However, it is possible that $w_D < 0$ when $w_A = \bar{w}_A$. But, this means

$$\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(\bar{w}_A, 0) = \sum_{i \in I(\bar{w}_A)} y_i(\bar{w}_A, 0) > 1,$$

suggesting that one should look for $w_A > \bar{w}_A$ that leads to $w_D = 0$ and smaller $y_i(w_A, w_D)$'s.

Clearly, $J_i(w_A)$ is decreasing in w_A . It then follows that $y_i(w_A, w_D)$ is also decreasing w.r.t. $w_A > \bar{w}_A$. Thus, for a given w_A , if $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) > 1$, one should look for the NE with $w'_A > w_A$; if $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) < 1$, one should look for the NE with $w'_A < w_A$.

Here we present an algorithm to approximate a pair of Nash Equilibrium strategies $(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*)$ within a given tolerance, ϵ . The algorithm starts searching from $w_A = \bar{w}_A$ and uses a bisection search scheme to converge.

Algorithm 1. Finding NE Strategies $(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*)$ under incomplete CSI.

Inputs. State information of the communication network: $T_i, \mathbb{E}[A_i], \beta_i^k, p_i^k, \forall k = 1, \dots, K_i, \forall i = 1, \dots, N$. The background noise $\sigma_i, \forall i = 1, \dots, N$; the total available power J ; and the explicit tolerance $\epsilon \leq 0.01$.

Step 1. Sort $\mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(0)]$ in descending order.

Step 2. Let $w_A \leftarrow \bar{w}_A$. Find $(\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ using Eqs. (10), (11) and (12).

Step 2a. If $w_D \geq 0$, then $(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*) = (\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ is a pair of NE strategies and the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, go to step 2b

Step 2b. If $w_D < 0$, let $w_A^{LB} \leftarrow w_A$ and h be the largest integer such that $J_i(w_A) > 0$. Go to step 3.

Step 3. Let $w_A \leftarrow \mathbb{E}[C_{E_h}(0)]$. Find $(\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ using Eqs. (10), (11) and (12).

Step 3a. If $|\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) - 1| \leq \epsilon$, then $(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*) = (\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ is a pair of NE strategies and the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, go to step 3b

Step 3b. If $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) > 1 + \epsilon$, then let $w_A^{LB} \leftarrow w_A$ and $h \leftarrow h - 1$. Go to step 3. Otherwise, go to step 3c.

Step 3c. If $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) < 1 - \epsilon$, then let $w_A^{UB} \leftarrow w_A$. Go to step 4.

Step 4. Let $w_A \leftarrow \frac{1}{2}(w_A^{UB} + w_A^{LB})$. Find $(\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ using equations (10), (11) and (12).

Step 4a. If $|\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) - 1| \leq \epsilon$, then $(\mathbf{J}^*, \mathbf{y}^*) = (\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ is a pair of NE strategies and the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, go to step 4b

Step 4b. If $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) > 1 + \epsilon$, then let $w_A^{LB} \leftarrow w_A$. Go to step 4. Otherwise, go to step 4c.

Step 4c. If $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) < 1 - \epsilon$, then let $w_A^{UB} \leftarrow w_A$. Go to step 4.

5 Numerical Illustrations

This section compares the following four different power allocation strategies for the friendly interferer:

1. Strategy 1: the game-theoretic power allocation strategy derived by Theorem 4, which takes into account the uncertainty of the eavesdropper's fading channel gains.

2. Strategy 2: the game-theoretic power allocation strategy that uses mean values of the eavesdropper’s fading channel gains as estimators. It can be calculated following Theorem 4 with $R_i(x) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i]T_i}{\sigma_i + \mathbb{E}[B_i]x}$ and $H_i(w_A, w_D) = \frac{(\gamma + w_D)(\sigma_i + \mathbb{E}[B_i]J_i(w_A))^2}{T_i \mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}[B_i]}$.
3. Strategy 3: the power allocation strategy of a friendly interferer who expects eavesdropping attacks at every channel with equal probability but still takes into account the uncertainty of the eavesdropper’s fading channel gains. This strategy can be derived following Theorem 2.
4. Strategy 4: the power allocation strategy of a friendly interferer who expects eavesdropping attacks at every channel with equal probability, but this time the friendly interferer uses mean values of the eavesdropper’s fading channel gains as estimators. This strategy can be calculated following Theorem 2 with $F_i(x) := y_i T_i \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \mathbb{E}[B_i]}{(\sigma_i + \mathbb{E}[B_i]x)^2} - \gamma$.

Consider a wireless communication network with 5 parallel channels. Let A_i ’s be the random eavesdropping channel gains of transmission signals whose mean values are $\{\mathbb{E}[A_i], i = 1, \dots, 5\} = (0.75, 0.6, 0.4, 0.275, 0.25)$. Let B_i ’s be the random eavesdropping channel gains of jamming signals such that

$$[\beta_i^k] = \begin{bmatrix} 0.4 & 0.8 & 1.2 \\ 0.4 & 0.7 & 1.0 \\ 0.1 & 0.5 & 0.9 \\ 0.25 & 0.6 & 0.95 \\ 0.15 & 0.45 & 0.75 \end{bmatrix}, [p_i^k] = \begin{bmatrix} 0.33 & 0.34 & 0.33 \\ 0.33 & 0.34 & 0.33 \\ 0.33 & 0.34 & 0.33 \\ 0.33 & 0.34 & 0.33 \\ 0.33 & 0.34 & 0.33 \end{bmatrix},$$

where the i th row stands for channel i and the k th column stands for scenario k . Note that the mean values of B_i ’s are $\{\mathbb{E}[B_i], i = 1, \dots, 5\} = (0.8, 0.7, 0.5, 0.6, 0.45)$. Also, let $\{g_i, i = 1, \dots, 5\} = (1.2, 1.0, 0.9, 0.75, 0.7)$, $\gamma = 1.5$, $J = 1$, $T_i = 1$ and $\sigma_i = 0.12, \forall i = 1, \dots, N$.

For strategy 1, the optimal power allocation plan is $\mathbf{J}_1^* = (0.292, 0.218, 0.129, 0, 0)$ with payoff $v_D(\mathbf{J}_1^*, \mathbf{y}_1^*) = 34.668$, as shown in Fig. 2a. The eavesdropper’s




Fig. 2. Plots of \mathbf{J}^* and \mathbf{y}^* for strategies 1 and 2.

best response is $\mathbf{y}_I^* = (0.317, 0.272, 0.307, 0.104, 0)$. Due to the cost coefficient γ , channel 4 is not protected by cooperative jamming even when there is unused power.

For strategy 2, the optimal power allocation plan is $\mathbf{J}_{II}^* = (0.288, 0.229, 0.134, 0.014, 0)$ as shown in Fig. 2a. Compared to strategy 1, the friendly interferer adjusts the jamming powers to cover channel 4. If the friendly interferer uses \mathbf{J}_{II}^* to face the eavesdropper who is still using the NE strategy \mathbf{y}_I^* given by Theorem 4, then the payoff given by Eq. (3) is $v_D(\mathbf{J}_{II}^*, \mathbf{y}_I^*) = 34.661$, which is 0.02% worse than the payoff brought by strategy 1.




Fig. 3. Plots of \mathbf{J}^* and \mathbf{y} for strategy 3 and 4.

For strategy 3, let $\mathbf{y} = (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2)$. The optimal power allocation plan is $\mathbf{J}_{III}^* = (0.197, 0.160, 0.065, 0.040, 0.004)$, as shown in Fig. 3a. Compared to strategies 1, the friendly interferer covers every channel instead of using a threshold policy. To use this power allocation plan \mathbf{J}_{III}^* against a strategic eavesdropper who commits to \mathbf{y}_I^* , the friendly interferer will waste cooperative jamming power on channel 5, and the expected payoff given by Eq. (3) is 34.566, which is 0.29% worse than strategy 1.

For strategy 4, still let $\mathbf{y} = (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2)$. The optimal power allocation plan is again covering all channels with $\mathbf{J}_{IV}^* = (0.204, 0.167, 0.087, 0.047, 0.006)$, as shown in Fig. 3b. To use this power allocation plan \mathbf{J}_{IV}^* against a strategic eavesdropper who commits to \mathbf{y}_I^* , the expected payoff given by Eq. (3) is 34.581, which is 0.25% worse than strategy 1 and 0.23% worse than strategy 2.

These examples demonstrate that the friendly interferer in choosing the best resource allocation plan should not assume a simplistic attack behavior for a strategic eavesdropper. Additionally, even though strategies 1 and 2 (also 3 and 4) have quite similar performance in the given examples, in more realistic FDM systems involving more than 100 channels (see [22]), these differences are expected to be more significant.

6 Conclusions and Future Research

In this paper, we consider a cooperative jamming game for a multi-channel wireless communication network against an active eavesdropper when the eavesdropping channel gains are uncertain. We present a non-zero sum game to help the defender find the optimal cooperative jamming power allocation strategy under the assumption that the eavesdropper will strategically pick her targets. It turns out that the optimal power allocation strategy follows the classic water-filling scheme. An algorithm to approximate the optimal strategy to within a given error threshold is also presented. We show that the channel gains of cooperative jamming signals should not be simply approximated using mean values if the defender wants to use the optimal power allocation strategy.

Of interest for future research is an extension of this model to the case in which the strategic eavesdropper can attack more than a single channel. Another possible extension is to include the transmission power control problem as part of the defender's decision.

Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3

Note that

$$\mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(J_i)] = \frac{\partial v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})}{\partial y_i}.$$

Given $y_m^o = 1$ and $y_i^o = 0, \forall i \neq m$, Theorem 2 implies

$$y_i^o T_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \beta_i^k p_i^k}{\sigma_i^2} - \gamma = -\gamma < w_D, \forall i \neq m,$$

which leads to $\tilde{J}_m^o(\tilde{w}_D, \mathbf{y}^o) = 0, \forall i \neq m$.

Assume $(\tilde{\mathbf{J}}^o(\tilde{w}_D), \mathbf{y})$ is a pair of NE strategies. It is required that

$$w_A \geq \mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(0)], \forall i \neq m,$$

by KKT conditions (8). Also, since $y_m^o > 0$, then

$$w_A = \mathbb{E}[C_{E_m}(J_m^o(\tilde{w}_D))] \leq \mathbb{E}[C_{E_m}(0)],$$

by KKT conditions (8). Thus, it must be true that

$$\mathbb{E}[C_{E_m}(0)] \geq \mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(0)], \forall i \neq m,$$

$$\mathbb{E}[C_{E_m}(J_m^o(\tilde{w}_D))] \geq \mathbb{E}[C_{E_i}(0)], \forall i \neq m,$$

for the assumption to be true. □

Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 4

Let w_A be the Lagrange multiplier for the eavesdropper's optimization problem (6). Note that

$$R_i(J_i) = \frac{\partial v_E(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y})}{\partial y_i},$$

$$R_i(0) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] T_i}{\sigma_i},$$

and $R_i(J_i)$ is decreasing w.r.t. $J_i \geq 0$. Let \mathbf{J}^* be the cooperative jamming strategy in the NE. Note that

$$R_i(J_i^*) \leq w_A, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, N,$$

as required by KKT condition (9). Thus, if $R_i(0) > w_A$, then $J_i^* > 0$. Let w_D be the Lagrange multiplier for the defender's optimization problem (5) and \mathbf{y}^* be the attack strategy in the NE. By KKT condition (7), if $J_i^* > 0$, then

$$y_i^* T_i \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \frac{\mathbb{E}[A_i] \beta_i^k P_i^k}{(\sigma_i + \beta_i^k J_i^*)^2} - \gamma = w_D \geq 0,$$

thus giving $y_i^* > 0$. But, if $y_i^* > 0$, then

$$R_i(J_i^*) = w_A,$$

by KKT condition (9). In summary, if $R_i(0) > w_A$, then J_i^* is the unique root of the equation,

$$R_i(x) = w_A.$$

If $R_i(0) \leq w_A$, then

$$w_A \geq R_i(0) > R_i(J_i), \quad \forall J_i > 0,$$

which leads to $J_i^* = 0$ since $R_i(J_i^*) < w_A$ if $J_i^* > 0$. Thus, let us define $\mathbf{J}(w_A) := \mathbf{J}^*$ to show that the NE cooperative jamming strategy is dependent on w_A .

Note that $H_i(w_A, w_D)$ is the unique root of the equation,

$$\left. \frac{\partial v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}^*)}{\partial J_i} \right|_{\mathbf{J}=\mathbf{J}^*} = w_D,$$

w.r.t. y_i^* .

If $R_i(0) > w_A$, then $J_i^* > 0$, which leads to $y_i^* = H_i(w_A, w_D)$ by KKT condition (7).

If $R_i(0) < w_A$, then $R_i(J_i^*) = R_i(0) < w_A$ since $J_i^* = 0$. It follows that $y_i^* = 0$ by KKT condition (9).

If $R_i(0) = w_A$, then $J_i^* = 0$, but it is possible to have $y_i^* > 0$ in a NE as long as

$$\begin{cases} \left. \frac{\partial v_D(\mathbf{J}, \mathbf{y}^*)}{\partial J_i} \right|_{\mathbf{J}=\mathbf{J}^*} \leq w_D, \text{ by KKT condition (7),} \\ y_i^* \geq 0, \\ y_i^* + \sum_{j \in I(w_A)} y_j^* \leq 1. \end{cases}$$

Thus, $\mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D)$ in (12) is correctly defined to satisfy KKT conditions (7) and (9). Note that it is possible to have

$$\begin{aligned}
 & - y_i(w_A, w_D) = H_i(w_A, w_D) < 1 - \sum_{j \in I(w_A)} y_j(w_A, w_D), \text{ or} \\
 & - \sum_{j \in I(w_A)} y_j(w_A, w_D) > 1.
 \end{aligned}$$

So the constraint $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) = 1$ is not guaranteed by (12).

Finally, it is required that

$$w_D(J - \sum_{i=1}^N J_i(w_A)) = 0.$$

Thus, if $\sum_{i \in I(w_A)} J_i(w_A) < J$, then $w_D = 0$. In this case, the only requirement missing for $(\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ to be a pair of NE strategies is to satisfy

$$\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) = 1.$$

Now look at the case when $\sum_{i \in I(w_A)} J_i(w_A) = J$. Following (11) and (12) when $\sum_{i \in I(w_A)} J_i(w_A) = J$, it is guaranteed that $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) = 1$. However, it is possible that $w_D < 0$, so the only requirement for $(\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$ to be a pair of NE strategies is to satisfy $w_D \geq 0$.

In summary, following (10), (11) and (12), if

1. $w_D \geq 0$, and
2. $\sum_{i=1}^N y_i(w_A, w_D) = 1$,

then (w_D, w_A) is a proper pair of Lagrange multipliers for the Nash equilibrium, $(\mathbf{J}(w_A), \mathbf{y}(w_A, w_D))$. □

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